And the third…
As noted above, utilitarian theories tend to share the following features:
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1. Pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically valuable.
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2. It is right to maximise that which is intrinsically valuable.
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3. Only outcomes are of moral concern; the character and actions of moral agents are only important insofar as they affect outcomes.
Critics of utilitarianism have pointed out that the acceptance of any of these claims can lead to highly counterintuitive results. I shall examine each of them in turn to see whether the criticisms stand up to scrutiny.
The most powerful criticism of the idea that nothing but pleasure is of intrinsic value is a thought experiment devised by Robert Nozick. He asks us to imagine a machine that we could plug ourselves into and feel any experience we desired. We could program a rich life for ourselves, perhaps as a novelist or mountaineer, and only leave the machine once a year in order to program a new suite of experiences for ourselves. Nozick states that few people would choose to enter the experience machine, thereby demonstrating that we value more than just pleasurable experiences. He suggests that people value living in contact with reality over pleasurable experiences. Even the fact that some people would choose to enter the machine does not invalidate Nozick’s claim. Provided that at least one person would choose not to plug in, it would show that something other than experience has value for them.
There are two very common replies to this thought experiment. One is that the example is unrealistic, while the other is that our moral intuitions about it may be wrong. These replies are not unique to the experience machine objection; in fact, they are used against many of the objections to utilitarianism. As for the first reply, it is certainly true that the experience machine is not a very realistic example. Of course, more realistic examples can be envisioned. Euphoric drugs, for instance, provide pleasurable experiences and diminish the user’s grip on reality. Ultimately, though, the realism of thought experiments is not relevant. Thought experiments are designed see whether statements that appear to be obviously true actually are true. They do this by describing a situation in which the truth of the statement leads to highly counterintuitive results. Provided the thought experiment is logically coherent, it does not matter whether the situation is impossible in practice.
Having said that, thought experiments do not prove that a statement is false, only that it is counterintuitive. Utilitarians often make the argument that our intuitions may be wrong. Empirical evidence suggests that, in at least some cases, this is true. For example, moral intuitions and emotions seem to have evolved to elicit altruistic behaviour in other people. However, even without a psychological explanation of our intuitions, it is still clear that our intuitions cannot be the final arbiter of what is right and wrong. If they were as reliable as the thought experiments seem to suggest they are, we would have no need of a moral theory because our intuitions would be good enough. Clearly this is not the case. Peter Singer has suggested that reasoning is like an escalator; the initial premises are fairly innocuous but the process can lead us to absurd conclusions. He emphasises that the absurdity of those conclusions has no bearing whatsoever on their truth or falsity. The problem with Singer’s metaphor, however, is that he fails to mention that the escalator is itself built on a foundation of intuition. He may accept the premises of utilitarianism as self-evident but the critics of the theory disagree. Knowing which intuitions are correct is a problem for metaethics, not normative ethics, and is therefore beyond the scope of this essay. Despite this, most of the criticisms of utilitarianism appeal to our intuitions so it is necessary to show why the results of these thought experiments are not as counterintuitive as they first seem.
In the case of the experience machine this is very difficult because statements about what one values cannot be refuted by other people. If you prefer beer to wine, I cannot tell you that you are wrong. The same applies if I try to tell you that you prefer pleasurable experiences to living in contact with reality. However, you can only live in contact with reality because you experience it. In effect, you are already living in an experience machine, albeit one that you program constantly as you go about your life. When someone says that they prefer real life to the experience machine, all they are saying is that they prefer the suite of experiences they get from real life to those they would get in the machine. Experiences are the all that is valuable because they are all that we have.
